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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEYENS-SALT LAKE CITY, 
IXl'. 
Appellant, 
vs. 
RAY WONG, JAi\1 LEO and YEE 
TONG HOW, a partnership doing 
business as China Tea Garden, 
Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
7920 
STATEMENT OF· THE CASE 
The appellant brought an action against the respond-
ents, alleging that on or about September 22, 1950, the 
defendants in the course of conducting their restaurant 
business on the second floor of a building located at ll51h 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, negligently 
maintained and operated their drainage and water sys-
tem thereby causing or permitting large quantities of 
water to seep through and into the ceiling and walliS of 
plaintiff's ladies apparel store, which store is located on 
the ground floor of the same building. Due to this inci-
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dent, the appellant claimed it was damaged and sough) 
recovery in that action. The appellant further alleged 
that as a result of the water seepage, large section'S of 
plaintiff's ceiling and wall plaster fell in on October 12, 
1950, requiring large expenditures of money on the part 
of the appellant. 
The respondents generally denied any negligence on 
·their part and raised, by way of an affirmative defense, 
contributory negligence on the part of the appellant. 
The court instructed the.jury generally on the ques- 1 
tion of respondent'S alleged negligence and on the mea- ·II 
sure of damages awardable if appellant was allowed to 
recover. The court also instructed the jury as to the j 
meaning and application of the doctrine of res ipsa . 
loquitur. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defend-
ant-respondents and against the plaintiff-appellant, no 
cause of action. The appellant herein made a motion for 
a new trial, which motion wa'S denied. As a result of 
such denial, this appeal has followed. 
The question then presented in this case is as fol-
lows: Where, without warning, a store is suddenly dam-
aged, first by water leaking through their ceiling from 
the floor above them and later through the collaP'se of 
said ceiling, may a jury find for the defendants whose 
failure to act andjor discover the defect in his pipe~ 
proximately caused the plaintiff's damages~ 
STATEMEN'T OF FACT'S 
The respondents in this action, since 1938, have oper-
ated as a partner'Ship, a restaurant, known as the China 
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Tea Garden, located on the second floor of a building 
located at 115% South ~[ain Street in Salt Lake City, 
l~tah. The appellant, in this action, has since 1943, oper·-
ated a ladies apparel store on the ground floor of the 
before-mentioned building. The appellant is a New York 
Corporation doing business in Utah as Stevens-Salt Lake 
City Incorporated. 
On September :2:2, 1950 or thereabouts, MI"S. Sally 
Peers, Manager of the Stevens' store, discovered that 
water was running from the ceiling above a portion of 
the store (Tr. 103). Upon discovery of the leakage, Mrs. 
Peers notified the respondents above, showing them the 
leakage and she then ordered that that portion of the 
ceiling be roped off (Tr. 103 and 104). The entire 'Store 
was closed during the morning of September 22nd. The 
roped off portion of the store was closed for the entire 
day. The afternoon of September 22nd, all the store 
except the roped off portion was open for business. The 
roped off department was open for business the next day, 
September 23rd. 
nirs. Peers testified that water dripped from the 
ceiling and wall all that day of September 22nd (Tr. 104). 
Sometime later, on or about September 25, 1950, ::t 
representative of the respondents called on Mrs. Peers 
at the appellant's place of business. Mrs. Peers was told 
to have the place "fixed up" at the respondent's expensP-
(Tr. 105). There is no evidence as to this matter with 
respect to what the respondent's representative meant 
when he told Mrs. Peers to "fix the place up." Mrs. 
Peers testified that prior to October 12, 1950, no platster 
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fell from the ceiling (Tr. 105). 
Mrs. Peers next testified that due to the leakage, the 
ceiling was badly in need of a paint job and that a painter 
on two occasions examined the premises with the idea 
of having the damaged portions painted. Mrs. Peers 
wa'S told it would be advisable to wait until the ceiling 
dried to have the painting done (Tr. 105 and Tr. 106). 
Before the ceiling dried sufficiently to be painted, the 
ceiling collapsed on October 12, 1950 or thereabouts (Tr. 
107). 
Mrs. Peers testified that she ordered the store closed 
on the day the ceiling fell, having been advised, by Mr. 
Floyd Goodson, Battalion Chief of the Salt Lake Fire 
Department, that it was not safe to keep the store open. 
The 'Store remained closed for one week while repairs 
were being made (Tr. 107). 
It is in the record that a substantial amount of mer-
chandise of the appellant was damaged due to both of 
the before-mentioned incidents. It is also in the record, 
and need not be mentioned here, that appellant suffered 
substantial incidental damages due to the two before-
mentioned incidents of September 22, 1950 and October 
12, 1950. 
Mrs. Peern testified that after the portion of the 
ceiling collapsed, that merchandise which could con-
veniently be removed was removed to another part of 
·the store. The balance of the merchandise was covered 
by a heavy curtain so that it would not be further dam-
aged when the ceiling was replastered (Tr. 123). 
Mrs. Peers testified that on or about September 23, 
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1950, she vi-.:;ited the respondents at their place of bus. 
ness. She observed workmen working on the pipes in th(-. 
respondenf-s plare of business. Apparently, respondents 
ordered the water shut off as there was no more dripping 
after Septen1ber :23rd or thereabouts (Tr. 115). 
On stipulation by counsel, a clause in a lease between 
the owner of the building at 115¥2 South Main Street 
in Salt Lake City and the China Tea Garden was admit-
ted in e·vidence. The clause reads, "And the lessee-.:; agree 
that they will indemnify the occupants of the ground floor 
of said building for any damage sustained by said occu-
pants by reason of negligence of lessees." (Tr. 133). 
:Jir. Ray \Yong, one of the re'Spondents in this action, 
testified that on or about September 22, 1950, he wac 
notified of the leakage in Stevens' Store. He testified 
that he found no water in his place of business. He 
then ordered the water shut off and at that time, a leak 
in the pipe was discovered (Tr. 137). 
~Ir. Wong further testified that the pipe had been 
installed in 1938, when the China Tea Garden was first 
opened (Tr. 138). 
On cross examination, Mr. Wong testified that he 
didn't know how long the water had been running before 
it came through to the downstairs. Mr. Wong testified in 
substance that it was necessary to take out the wains-
coating from the wall before it could be determined that 
the pipe wa-s leaking (Tr. 140). Mr. Wong further testi-
fied that the pipe was flush against the wall, having a 
wainscoating cover on top of the pipe (Tr. 141). 
Mr. Wong's testimony continued as follows: 
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"Q. Now, when had that wainscoating been put 
in there~ 
"A. When we opened up. 
"Q. When you first opened up~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You didn't do any work on the pipe or wains-
coating since 19381 
"A. No. 
"Q. Which was twelve years before~ 
"A. No." (Tr. 142). 
Mrs. Sally Peers, later in the trial, testified that 
when she visited the respondent's place of busine'Ss, she 
saw the pipe which had been respon'Sible for the leakage. 
She ~estified that, "The pipe was ve-ry corroded and rusty 
and it was in very bad condition." (Tr. 146). 
Mr. Gerald Rosenberg, president of the appellant 
corporation, in his deposition, testified in great detail 
as to the extent of the appellants alleged damages, both 
direct and indirect and incidental due to the. two inci-
dent~S of September 22, 1950 and October 12, 1950 (Tr. 
37-102). 
QUESTIONS INVOLVED 
Five arguments are relied on in this court as ground 
for reversal. 
1. THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
TEND TO NEGATIVE THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
THAT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE PLUMBING 
WHICH RELEASED THE WATER FROM OVERHEAD WAS 
WITHIN THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
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2. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW, 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
FROl\1 WHICH T.,HE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY ~EGLIGENT, 
BUT EVEN IF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY WAS BASED 
UPON ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER IN 
SUPPORT OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF UP TO THE TIME WHEN THE WATER 
DAMAGE OCCURRED ON SEPTEl\IBER 22, 1950 AND 
THEREFORE, AT THE LEAST, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE 
FOUND FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO THE EXTENT OF THE 
WATER DAMAGE THAT RESULTED ON THAT DATE. 
3. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW, 
INASl\IUCH AS THE JURY DID NOT FOLLOW THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6, AND FOUND FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS, ALTHOUGH THE COURT INSTRUCTED 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD ONLY OVERCOME THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IF THEY OFFERED AN 
EXPLANATION AS TO HOW THE WATER CAME TO 
ESCAPE WITHOUT THEIR FAULT, AND THE DEFEND-
ANTS DID NOT OFFER SUCH EXPLANATION. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, WHICH ASKED 
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS DID NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
THEY DID ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DAMAGE, TO 
OVERCOME THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE RAISED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4, AND BY SO 
DOING THE JURY MIGHT HAVE SPECULATED THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF SOME 
OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT IN THE 
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THUS FOUND 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH THE JURY WOULD 
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NOT HAVE DONE IF THE JURY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED 
THAT IT MUST FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THE 
NEGLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN THAT OF SOME OTHER 
PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT UNDER THE 
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4 WAS 
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE 
OF STRICT LIABILITY. UNDER THIS DOCTRINE, THE 
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED BY THE LEAKAGE OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PIPE. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT 
TEND TO NEGATIVE THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
THAT ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE PLUMBING 
WHICH RELEASED THE WATER FROM OVERHEAD WAS 
WITHIN THE COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEFEND-
ANTS, AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE 
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The appellant contends that the respondent in this 
case adduced no evidence whatever which would either 
tend to explain why water came to leak through appel-
lant's ceiling without the fault of the respondents or 
tend to show that respondents were not negligent in 
allowing the water to 'Seep through appellant's ceiling or 
discover the leaking water before great damage wa~ 
done to the appellant. 
The record is completely devoid of any evidence 
which might explain why the leakage occurred without 
the respondent's fault. The only evidence offered by the 
respondents which might remotely tend to show they 
were not negligent is contained in the testimony of one 
of the respondents, Mr. Wong: 
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··Q. How long had that pipe been installed if you 
know1 
·· ~-\.. Since we opened. 
··Q. "\Yhen did you open 1 
"A. 1938. 
··Q. Do you know who installed the pipe 1 
··~-\.. The guy that used to call•Tracy; I don't 
know where his shop is now. He used to have 
a shop at the end of Plumb Alley, I don't 
know whether die now. 
··Q. "\Yas his name Tracy~ 
··A. Casey. 
··Q. Did you understand Casey was a plumber~ 
"A. Yes, * * * well, he got a shop in there, a 
plumbing shop. 
"Q. What kind of material'S did Casey use, what 
kind of pipes did he use putting this itt~ 
"A. I don't understand about pipe, he fix all the 
- . 
plpe.-
"Q. Was it your understanding what kittd of pipe 
he should use~ 
"A. He should use good pipe. 
"Q. And do you know whether he had ne·w pipe 
or notf 
"A. I don't know; I don't understand pipe. 
"Q. Did you pay for it on the basis that he would 
use new pipe~ 
"A. Well that is what we pay." (Tr. 138-139). 
On the basi'S of the above testimony alone, can it be 
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said that the respondents produced at least some evidence 
to show that they were not negligent~ The appellant 
contends that this evidence standing alone, could not be 
taken as any evidence to show that respondents were 
not negligent. At be'St, all this evidence shows is that 
when respondents moved into their place of business, 
water and plumbing pipe was installed. There was no 
evidence even going to prove the pipe was new when pur-
chased and installed; and there was no evidence what- , 
ever going to show what quality the pipe was. There i'S, 4 
however, evidence in the record which shows that from 
1938 until the first incident occurred in September of 
1950, the pipes were never examined or inspected by 
anyone (Tr. 142). 
The later decisions in this state seem to stand for 
the proposition that the doctrine of re'S ipsa loquitur, 
when applicable, gives rise to an inference of negligence 
on the part of the defendant, which justifies but does not 
necessarily compel a verdict in favor ·of the plaintiff. 
White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 102 Pac. 2nd 249; Jenson 
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 Pac. 2nd 958; 
Angerma;n Co. v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169. 
The facts in the case at hand pres en ted a re'S ipsa 
loquitur situation, and the trial court correctly instructed 
the jury that the doctrine was applicable (Court's In-
struction No. 6). Therefore, in this case, the doctrine of J 
res ipsa loquitur being applicable, an inference was 
raised that the defendant~ were negligent. The defend-
ants, now respondents, offered no evidence in rebuttal 
to explain why the incidents occurred without their fault, 
10 
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and they offered no real evidence that they were not 
negligent in allowing the water to flow and in not dis-
covering the flow before substantial injury was inflicted 
upon the plaintiff-appellant. 
This court has recognized that the inference arising 
under -the ma..um res ipsa loquitur may and will vary 
in 'Strength, and that under son1e circumstances, and espe-
cially in the absence of evidence by the defendant, may 
be so strong as to compel a finding of negligence. Jordan 
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Utah, 218 Pac. 2nd 660, at 
page 663 ( l'tah 1950); White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, at 
page 488, 108 Pac. 2nd 249, at page 251; Z occolillo v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 39, at page 63, 177 
Pac. 201, at page 211; and Angerman Co. v. Edgemon, 76 
Utah 394, 290 Pac. 169, at page 171. The appellant feels 
that the inference which arose in this case was so strong 
that the jury was, as a matter of law, compelled to find 
in the appellant's favor. Due to the nature of the injury, 
appellant wa'S unable to show any direct, specific acts 
of negligence on the part of the respondents. However, 
the evidence is all in support of the inference that de-
fendants were negligent. There is evidence in the record 
that respondents never inspected the pipe which caused 
the mischief since it was installed, 'SOme twelve year8 
before (Tr. 140). There is also evidence in the record 
to show that the pipe in question, when examined, after 
the first incident of September 22, 1950, was in a danger-
. ous and defective condition (Tr. 146). One of the re-
spondents te'Stified that he was not even sure if the per-
son who was hired to install the pipe was a plumber. 
11 
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He further testified that he had no idea what kind or 
quality of pipe was, in fact, installed (Tr. 138-139). 
It then appears in this case that the inference of 
negligence raised by the factual application of the doc-
trine of re'S ipsa loquitur was strongly supported by all ~ 
the evidence·, which could have possibly been adduced .:'l 
under the circumstances of the case. On the other hand, 
the respondents, defendants below, brought in no evi-
dence whatever either going to show they were not negli-
gent or going to explain how the injury came about with-
out their fault. rrherefore, the appellant now contends 
that the finding of the jury was against the law and the 
evidence, and a'Sks that the decision reached in the trial 
court be reversed upon this ground. 
One of the most recent Utah cases which applies 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is Whit-e v. Pir~~ney, 99 
Utah 485, 108 Pac. 2nd 249. In that case, the court in-
structed the jury that res ipsa loquitur was applicable, 
but refused to instruct the jury that defendant was 
guitty of negligence as a ma:tter of law. Plaintiff ~ 
contended that he was entitled to such an instruction 
where the above doctrine was applicable. The court, in 
holding the instruetion was properly refused said, "This 
court is committed to the view that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur doe'S not give rise to a legal presumption 
of negligence but justifies the fact finder to infer negli- ·j 
gence." ·~l 
The court goes on to say, ''In certain cases if no 
explanation of the accident is offered, the situation may ~ 
forceahly impel a finding of negligence." In this case, 
12 
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plaintiff strictly relied on the doctrine while defendants 
offered 'Substantial evidence to show they were not negli-
gent. The jury brought in a finding of no cause of action. 
The c~urt goes on to say, '"Or, to put it another way, 
have defendants successfully overcome the inference of 
negligence which would have been drawn at the close of 
plaintiff's evidence so as to render a verdict for defend~ 
ants the only reasonable one~" Thus, the court in this 
case says that even though the doctrine gives rise only 
to an inference of negligence, such inference, though 
not strong enough to entitle the plaintiff to an instruction 
that the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of 
law, is 'Strong enough, in certain cases, to compel the 
jury to find for the plaintiff if the defendant'offers no 
evidence to show his absence from negligence and even 
compels a jury finding in favor of the plaintiff wher~ 
only a scintilla of evidence is offered by the defendant 
to prove his absence from negligence. This last quoted 
statement, taken with the court's earlier 'Statement that, 
in certain cases, the doctrine alone may compel a jury 
finding in favor of the plaintiff, bears out appellant's 
assignments of error in this case: that the jury finding 
of no cause of action, was supported by neither the law 
nor the evidence. 
Later in White v. Pinney, the court 'States the law 
as it now exists in this state. "In cases where the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur applies, the inference of negli-
gence applies the want of proof of negligence, and the 
defendant is under the duty of rebutting this inference 
of negligence rather than evidence of negligence." Later 
13 
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in thi.'S opinion, the court goes on to say, "* * * And as 
the facts be more within the knowledge of defendant 
than of plaintiff, the burden of the evidence, of goin~ 
forward, is shifted to the defendant to show that he 
was not guilty of negligence.- In bearing this burden the 
defendant need not show that he used every precaution, 
care or skill to prevent the happening of the accident. 
It is sufficient if he shows that he US'ed the degree of 
care commell'surate with the dangers which men of pru-
dence would have anticipated under the circumstanceR. 
In the instant case, defendants made a showing sufficient 
to present a question of fact for the jury." The case is 41 
then authority for the proposition that the doctrine gives 
rise to an inference of negligence, which the defendant 
must somehow rebut to even present a question of fact 
for the jury. If the inference is in no manner rebutted-
no evidence being adduced by defendant-it would be 
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to direct a 
verdict in the plaintiff's favor. By the same token, even 
if a directed verdict is not requested, as no real question 
of fact is presented for the jury's deliberation, the jury 
would be compelled to find for the plaintiff. However, 
even if the defendant does offer a scintilla of evidence 
to rebut the inf·erence, it its contended that generally in 
other cases and specifically in the case at hand, the evi-
dence in rebuttal was so weak that a finding of no cause 
of action was not supported by the evidence. To this 
extent, the early cases of Williamson v. Salt Lake and 
Oregon Ry. Co., 172 Pac. 680 and Zocolillo v. Oregon. 
Short LineR. Co., 177 Pac. 201 were overruled by impli-
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cation in White v. Pinney. 'rhese two early ca'S·es held 
that in n1ost cases where res ipsa loquitur was applicable, 
the jury might con1pletely disregard the inference even 
where the defendant offered no evidence in rebuttal. 
This rule has never been supported by the weight of 
authority of courts throughout the United States. In 
38 Am. Jr. 310 at page 1007, the law as it exi'Sts in the 
great majority of jurisdiction in this country is stated 
as follows: "Conclusiveness of presumption or inference 
-the presumption or inference of negligence herein con-
sidered is, of course, a rebuttable presumption. It im-
ports merely that the plain tiff has made· out a prima 
facie case which entitles him to a favorable finding unless 
the defendant introduces evidence to meet and offset 
its effect." 
To the same effect is Michner v. Hutton et al., 265 
Pac. 238, a California case. Here the California court 
'Says that the maxim res ipsa loquitur gives rise to an 
inference of negligence, which inference may not be dis-
regarded by the jury, but must be weighed against the 
evidence adduced by the defendant to prove his absence 
fromnegligence. Thus, a finding in favor of the defend-
ant must have support in the evidence. 
In the above case, the court cites with appro;val 
Housel v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 139 Pac. 73, a Cali-
fornia case, where it is said, "The pre'Sumption (or infer-
ence) that the injury was caused by the negligence of 
the carrier, which is raised upon the proof by the plain-
tiff that he was injured while being carried as a pas-
senger, is itself a fact which the jury must con'Sider in 
15' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
determining its verdict, and which, in the absence of 
any other evidence, in reference to the negligence, neces-
sitates a verdict in favor of the plaintiff." 
In the dissenting opinion in Curby v. Bennett Glas.~ 
and Paint Co., 99 Utah 80, 103 Pac. 2nd 657, the dis-
osenters, after holding res ipsa loquitur to be applicable, 
say, "It therefore put upon the defendant the duty of 
explanation." The court then says that defendant's 
explanation was not sufficient to overcome the inference 
of negligence raised by the doctrine. "* * * To me, that 
is not a satisfactory explanation, and if resort to the 
rule of res ipsa loquitur is needed, then we oshould apply 
it." It is seen that the dissenters in this case felt that 1 
the inference raised by the doctrine could not be aban- ~ 
doned at will, and where a finding is returned in favor of 
the defendant where the maxim does apply, such a find-
ing ios subject to reversal unless the finding has at least ·' 
some evidence in the record to support it. It is sub-
J mitted that in the case before the bar, the jury's finding 
in favor of the defendants was in no manner supported 
by the record. 
In Angerman Co., Inc. v. Edgem.on et ux., 76 Utah 
394, 290 Pac. 169, a case, on its facts, very similar to the 1.·.· 
case at hand, the trial court inostructed the jury that the 1 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, and the 
jury found for the plaintiff. As in the case at hand, in 
the case cited above, the facts made out a case for the '"-~. 
application of the doctrine, and the defendants offered 1 
no explanation as to how the water came to escape or as 
to why it was permitted to flow for osuch a length of time ,, ..• 
16 
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and in such vohune as to find its way down through tht 
plaintiff'~ ceiling and upon the goods in the plaintiff's 
store. The court states, .. It was still the duty of the de-
fendant to use due care to discover the trouble and to 
stop the overflow and prevent the water from causing 
injury to the plaintiffs goods. vVhether they used due 
care or not in this respect was a question of fact for th~ 
jury to find frmu all the facts and circumstances shown 
in evidence in the case." It follows that in the case at 
hand, the respondents offered no evidence whatever 
that they used due care in discovering the trouble to 
prevent the ac-eident of September 22, 1950, so that the 
finding of no cause of action had no support in the 
record and was, for this reason, erroneous. Later in 
this opinion at page 173, the court implies that where 
the doctrine applies, and the defendant offers no ·expla-
nation of how the accident happened without his fault, 
the inference of defendant''S negligence is brought to 
bear. Then, even if defendant offers evidence of his 
freedom from negligence, though this creates a question 
for the jury, the defendant's evidence of freedom from 
negligence may he so weak and insufficient as to compel 
a finding favorable to the plaintiff. The appellant con-
tends that this was the situation here, and even if it be 
conceded that the defendants offered 'Some evidence to 
show their absence from negligence, such evidence was 
so weak and insufficient as to make a finding for the 
defendants opposed to the weight of the evidence. 
2. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW, 
FOR THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE 
17 
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\ 
FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT, 
BUT EVEN IF THE VERDICT OF rrHE JURY WAS BASED 
UPON ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE 
PLAINTIFF, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER IN 
SUPPORT OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF UP TO THE TIME WHEN THE WATER 
DAMAGE OCCURRED ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1950 AND 
THEREFORE, AT THE LEAST, THE JURY SHOULD HAVE 
FOUND FOR THE PLAINTIFF TO THE EXTENT OF THE 
WATER DAMAGE THAT RESULTED ON THAT DATE. 
The appellant first contends that there was not suffi-
cient evidence offered by the re'Spondent from which the 
jury would be justified in finding that the plaintiff was 
in any manner or at any time contributorily negligent. 
As to any possible contributory negligence on the 
part of the appellant after the incident of September 
22, 1950, leading up to the incident of October 12, 1950, 
the appellant contends that it was under a duty only 
to exercise the degree of care that a reasonable person 
would exercise under similar circumstances, and that 
the evidence in thi'S case is that no reasonable person 
could have foreseen that the plaster would fall, and that 
there is no evidence to sustain a claim of contributory 
negligence on the part of the appellant. On the other 
hand, there is evidence in the record going to show that 
appellant's conduct in the manner was in every sense 
prudent. Mr. Earl, a plastering contractor, testified tha.t 
where a ceiling is damaged by water, the u'Sual and 
customary procedure is not to immediately try to repair 
it but to wait until it dries to ascertain. the damage. 
This was exactly wltat the appellant did, but before the 
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· ceiling had dried, it collapsed on October 12, 1950 ( Tr. 
130). Therefore, a finding by the jury that appellant 
plaintiff below, was contributorily negligent after the 
incident of September 22, 1950 was not supported by the 
record. 
If it be conceded that the jury could have reasonably 
found for the defendants on the basi'S that plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent after the incident of Septern-
ber 22, 1950, still there was no evidence anywhere re-
motely in this case in support of any contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff up to the time when the water 
damage occurred on September 22, 19·50. It follows that 
at the very least the jury should have found for the 
plaintiff to the extent of the water damage that resulted 
on that date. 
· 3. THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IS AGAINST LAW, 
INASMUCH AS THE JURY DID NOT FOLLOW THE 
COURT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 6, AND FOUND FOR THE 
DEFENDANTS, ALTHOUGH THE COURT INSTRUCTED 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COULD ONLY OVERCOME THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE IF THEY OFFERED AN 
EXPLANATION AS TO HOW THE WATER CAME TO 
ESCAPE WITHOUT THEIR FAULT, AND THE DEFEND-
ANTS DID NOT OFFER SUCH EXPLANATION. 
In Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 Pac. 1094, this 
court said, "Juries may not without reason overturn legal 
presumptions or arbitrarily disregard positive state-
( ments of witnesses." The appellant contends that this 
was what the jury proceeded to do in the cas~ at hand. 
,. 
For apparently no rea'Son, the jury disregarded the 
·~ Court's Instruction No. 6 when there was no evidence 
-
offered by defendants either going to explain why the 
~ . '! 
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accident happened without their fault or going to show 
that the defendants were not negligent. Therefore, the 
finding of the jury of no cause of action was opposed 
to the Court's Instruction No. 6 and thus was against 
the law. 
In Knell v. Morris, 234 Pac. 2nd 1025 at page 1029, 
the California Court says, "It was the duty of defendant 
Mac Mar to exercise ordinary care to keep the heater 
in a reasonably safe condition so that water should not 
be permitted to escape and cause injury to the property 
of the occupant of the floor below. This duty was not 
limited to conditions actually known to be dangerous, 
but extended al-so to conditions which might have been 
found dange,rous by the exercise of reasonable care." 
In this case, the def·endant Mac Mar was in the exact 
~~n!:le position as the respondents in this case. He was 
the tenant above the plaintiff, who'Se goods had been 
damaged by the seepage of water from a defective pipe. 
From the rule of this case, it follows that the respond-
ents were under a duty to use due care to keep the pipes 
in a reasonably safe condition so that water would not 
be permitted: to es0ape and cause damage to the goods 
of the tenant below. Whether the re-spondents used due 
care or not would ordinarily have been a question for 
the jury, but here as there was an inference that due 
care had not been used and as there was some direct 
evidence tending to show due care was not used and as 
respondents offered no evidence whatever to show due 
care wa'S used, any finding by the jury in favor of the 
respondents was not supported by the evidence. 
20 
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4. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQl'ESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 3, WHICH ASKED 
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DE-
FENDANTS DID NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE THAT 
THEY DID ANYTHING TO PREVENT THE DAMAGE, TO 
OVERCOME THE INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE RAISED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
As mentioned before, the appellant contends that 
the respondents offered no evidence whatever either 
going to show that respondents were not negligent or 
going to explain how the incidents in question here might 
have happened without the respondent''S fault. The appel-
lant feels that it was entitled to have the jury instructed 
to the effect that defendants in the lower court pro-
duced no eYidence which tended to explain how the acci-
dents occurred without their fault and that no evidence 
was offered by the defendants below tending to show 
they were not negligent. Even conceding that the, jury, 
in this case, was entitled to reject the inference of negli-
gence entirely (which the appellant does not concede), 
still the appellant wa:s entitled to have the jury apprised 
of the fact that defendants below offered no evidenc·:~ 
which might tend to rebut the inference. 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 4, AND BY SO 
DOING THE JURY MIGHT HAVE SPECULATED THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF SOME 
!· OTHER PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT IN THE 
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS, AND THUS FOUND 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH THE JURY WOULD 
f NOT HAVE DONE IF THE JURY HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED 
!' THAT IT MUST FIND FOR THE PLAINTIFF IF THE 
• NEGLIGENCE HAD NOT BEEN THAT OF SOME OTHER 
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PERSON OR PERSONS WHO WERE NOT UNDER THE 
CONTROL OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INS1,RUCTION NO. 4 WAS 
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO INVOKE THE DOCTRINE 
OF STRICT LIABILITY. UNDER THIS DOCTRINE, THE 
DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED BY THE LEAKAGE OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PIPE. 
The appellant contends that the court should have 
instructed the jury to the effect that there was no evi-
dence in the case which even remotely tended to show 
that if the accidents were due to the negligence of some 
party, that they were due to the negligence of any party 
other than respondents. By failing to give such an 
instruction, the jury might have felt that they were 
authorized to speculate that the accident might have 
be'en caused by the negligent conduct of some party be-
sides the respondents. As there was no evidence in the 
case tending to lend weight to such a speculation, the 
jury would not have been justified in reaching such a 
conclusion. 
The appellant contends that the doctrine of strict 
liability was applicable to the case at hand. Under this 
doctrine, the defendants are liable for all damages proxi-
rnately caused by the defective instrumentality under 
their control. Appellant's Requested Instruction No. 4 
was sufficiently definite to enable appellant to now invoke 
the doctrine and claim that the failure of the trial court 
to give the instruction was erroneous due· to the applica-
tj on of the doctrine of strict liability. 
In 60 A.L.R. 4 75, the case of Horace W. Green v. 
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General Petroleum Corporation, :270 Par. ~)5:2 is di~­
cussed and annotated. This ease was decided by the 
California Supre1ne Court in 1928, an~ it still remains 
one of the leading caoses in the United States, which deals 
with the doctrine of strict liability. At page 480 in volume 
60 of A.L.R., the California Court says, "Where one, 
in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise· lawful 
and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known 
conditions, and, with knowledge that injury might result 
to another, proceeds and injury is done to the other a~l 
the direct and proximate consequence of the act, how-
ever carefully done, the one who does the act and cause'S 
the injury should, in all fairness, be required to conl-
pensate the other for the damage done." In this case, 
appellant's oil. well had "blown up" and 'Scattered oil and 
debris all over the land of the respondents. The trial 
court had given the respondents, plaintiffs below, a 
directed verdict on the ground that defendants were 
absolutely liable. The Supreme Court of California, in 
this case, held that the directed verdict was properly 
allowed. The court goes on to say, "In our judgment, 
no other legal con'Struction can be placed upon the opera-
tions of the appellant in this case tlran that, by its delib-
erate act of boring its well, it understood the burden 
and responsibility of controlling and confining whatever 
force or power it uncovered." The appellant contends 
that the facts in the case at bar made out a case for the 
application of the doctrine of liability without fault. 
The respondents, by their act of bringing on to their 
premi'Ses the water and plumbing pipe which caused tht~ 
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eventual mischief, undertook the burden and responsi-
bility of controlling and confining the water in the pipe 
which was under high pressure; thus, even if it be con-
ceded that the respondents were not negligent, the appel-
lant was entitled to prevail in the trial court as a matter 
of law due to the application of the doctrine of liability 
without fault. 
CONCLUSION 
Briefly stated, the appellant feels that the verdict 
of the jury in favor of the defendants had no 'SUpport 
whatever in the record, and the verdict for reasons 
stated at length in the brief, was opposed to the law as 
it exists in Utah and throughout the majority of juris-
dictions in the United States. The appellant feels that 
the court and the jury wrongfully construed the infer-
ence ari'Sing from the application of the maxim res ipsa 
loquitur, and finally the appellant feels that the verdict 
was opposed to the law because the facts in this case 
made ou t a case for the application of the doctrine of 
liability without fault. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHI'TE, WRIGHT & ARNOVITZ, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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